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LIFT HIGH THE CROSS?†:
CONTRASTING THE NEW EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CASES ON
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS ON GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
John Witte, Jr.∗
Nina-Louisa Arold∗∗
INTRODUCTION
A comparative anthropologist could not have asked for a better script: two
high profile cases, one before the European Court of Human Rights, the other
before the U.S. Supreme Court, each involving challenges to traditional
displays of crosses on government property. The European high court struck
down the cross. The American high court upheld the cross. Both cases are
procedurally complicated and are factually distinguishable. But the
juxtaposition of these decisions illustrates the growing contrast in European
and American attitudes toward traditional religious symbols on government
land and toward religious freedom more generally. Europe, as the heartland of
Christianity for nearly two millennia, seems to be moving towards everstronger policies of secularization and laïcité. America, once the champion of
strict separation of church and state, seems to be moving toward an ever more
generous accommodation of its religious traditions and symbols.
In Lautsi v. Italy,1 a mother of two children who attended an Italian public
school challenged an Italian tradition going back to 1924 that called for the

† This is the title of a hymn, composed by George William Kitchin (1887), revised by Michael R.
Newbolt, with music by Sidney R. Nicholson (1916). Come Brethren Follow Where Our Captain Trod,
HYMNARY.ORG, http://www.hymnary.org/text/come_christians_follow_where_our_savior (last visited Mar.
19, 2011).
∗ Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law, Alonzo L. McDonald Distinguished Professor, and Director of the
Center for the Study of Law and Religion, Emory University School of Law.
∗∗ Associate Professor, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Associate
Professor of Law, University of Lund, Sweden.
1 Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) [hereinafter Lautsi I], http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN
(follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Lautsi” in the “Case
Title” box and “Italy” in the “Respondent State” box) (referred to the Grand Chamber on March 1, 2010). The
hearing was held on June 30, 2010, and eight of the ten intervening states were participating to support the
Italian government. ECHR Crucifix Case: 20 European Countries Support the Crucifix, EUR. CENTER FOR L.
& JUST. (July 21, 2010), http://www.eclj.org/Releases/Read.aspx?GUID=983c3dd3-9c17-4b70-a01637851446ec0e&s=eur.
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display of a crucifix in each public school classroom.2 The perennial and
prominent presence of these overtly Christian symbols, Lautsi argued, was
contrary to the atheistic beliefs with which she wanted to raise and educate her
children.3 She thus sought to have the crucifixes removed.4 She won her case
in the Italian trial court.5 She lost before the Italian domestic courts, which
declared that the cross was an integral part of Italy’s history, culture, and
identity, and that the cross was itself a symbol of the nation’s distinct
commitment to liberty, pluralism, and toleration of all peaceable faiths.6 Lautsi
then appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that Italy’s
actions violated her and her children’s rights to education and to religious
freedom guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 2
(of Protocol Number 1) and Article 9.7
On November 3, 2009, a unanimous seven-judge chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights held for Lautsi.8 The Court found that the public
display of crucifixes in public school classrooms constituted a violation both of
the right of parents to educate their children in conformity with their own
convictions and of the right of children to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion, which included the right to be free from coerced religious
participation or observance.9 The Court ordered damages to Lautsi of €5000.10
Italy appealed, dismayed at what it took to be an assault on its national culture
and tradition.11
On June 30, 2010, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights heard further arguments in the case.12 At least twenty European nations
publicly stated their support for Italy and joined its criticism of the European
Court’s first chamber decision.13 The Lautsi case was taken under advisement
by the Grand Chamber, which was subject to intense lobbying pressure on both
sides.
2

See Lautsi I, supra note 1, paras. 1, 3, 20.
See id. para. 27.
4 Id. paras. 1, 7.
5 See id. paras. 13–15.
6 See Andrea Pin, Public Schools, the Italian Crucifix, and the European Court of Human Rights: The
Italian Separation of Church and State, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 95, 102 (2011).
7 Lautsi I, supra note 1, paras. 3, 27; see infra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
8 Lautsi I, supra note 1, para. 70.
9 See id. paras. 55–57.
10 Id. para. 70.
11 ECHR Crucifix Case: 20 European Countries Support the Crucifix, supra note 1.
12 Id.
13 For a full list of these twenty states, see id.
3

WITTE&AROLD GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 9:40 AM

“LIFT HIGH THE CROSS?”

7

On March 18, 2011, just as this Article was going to final press, the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights reversed the Chamber
below, and held fifteen to two in favor of Italy, halting at least for now the
steady march toward increasing secularization and laïcité.14 While this Article
retains our analysis of the original Chamber judgment against the backdrop of
earlier European Court cases, we reflect on the significance of the Grand
Chamber’s judgment in the Conclusion and show the growing convergence
with recent U.S. Supreme Court case law.
In Salazar v. Buono,15 a retired national park worker challenged the display
of a cross in a national park in the State of California.16 The Veterans of
Foreign Wars (“VFW”), a private group, had donated and erected the cross in
1934 as a memorial to fallen American soldiers.17 The cross stood alone,
visible on the horizon.18 A small sign at the base of the cross indicated that the
VFW had donated it.19 Buono brought suit claiming that the presence of the
cross on government land constituted an establishment of religion in violation
of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.20 A federal district court
found the cross display to be unconstitutional.21 Congress responded by
conveying a small parcel of the federal land with and around the cross to the
VFW, in exchange for a nearby private tract of land that was added to the
national park.22 The district court declared this purported Constitutional cure a
“sham,” and repeated its injunction that the cross be removed.23 The national
park service appealed, ultimately to the Supreme Court.24
A plurality of the Supreme Court ordered that the cross be retained.25 The
decision to enjoin Congress’s land sale, Justice Kennedy wrote for the
14 See Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) [hereinafter Lautsi II], http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/
homepage_EN (follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing
“Lautsi” in the “Case Title” box and “Italy” in the “Respondent State” box).
15 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
16 Id. at 1812.
17 Id. at 1811.
18 Id. at 1812.
19 Id. The signs have since been removed and the cross currently stands unmarked.
20 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”).
21 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1812.
22 Id. at 1813.
23 Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2009); see Adam Linkner, How
Salazar v. Buono Synthesizes Establishment Clause Precedent into a Single Test, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 57,
79 (2011).
24 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1814.
25 Id. at 1821.

WITTE&AROLD GALLEYSFINAL

8

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

6/28/2011 9:40 AM

[Vol. 25

plurality, required the district court to undertake a separate Constitutional
inquiry of whether Congress had violated the First Amendment Establishment
Clause; it could not simply assume that this land sale was a “sham” designed to
“evade” the first injunction.26 Congress had tried to resolve a “dilemma”
created by the district court: “It could not maintain the cross without violating
the injunction, but it could not remove the cross without conveying disrespect
for those [dead soldiers] the cross was seen as honoring. Deeming neither
alternative to be satisfactory,” Congress had instead sold the land and cross to
a private party.27 The district court now would have to judge the
Constitutionality of Congress’s actions on the merits.28 In Justice Kennedy’s
view, the district court would have to take into account the reality that, while
the cross was “certainly a Christian symbol,” it had been erected in the park
not “to promote a Christian message” or to “set the imprimatur of the state on a
particular creed. Rather, those who erected the cross intended simply to honor
our Nation’s fallen soldiers.”29 The district court would further have to
recognize that “[t]ime also has played its role” and that “the cross and the
cause it commemorated had become entwined in the public consciousness” and
part of “our national heritage.”30
The contrasts in these cases are as ironic as they are striking. It is no small
irony that Italy, a land saturated with Christian religious symbols, was ordered
to remove its crosses, while California, famous for its Hollywood-style
secularism and avant-garde culture, may keep a cross in place. It is no small
irony that, after so many centuries of cultural adaptation and application, a
cross in Italy was still judged to be an offensive religious symbol, while in
America, after a few short decades, a memorial cross was judged to be so
deeply woven into American “public consciousness” and “national heritage”
that it could no longer be removed.31 And it is no small irony that the European
Court, operating without an explicit prohibition on religious establishments,
struck down the cross, while the U.S. Supreme Court, armed with an explicit
Constitutional command that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion,”32 let the cross stand on land that Congress
controlled.
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 1814–21.
Id. at 1809.
Id. at 1820–21.
Id. at 1816–17 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1817.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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What is not so ironic or surprising is that the Lautsi court took this firm
stand against the public display of a cross in a public school setting. Young and
impressionable students, often compelled to be in school, are generally more
vulnerable to religious pressure and coercion, and western courts have thus
long been zealous in protecting them in the name of religious freedom. Indeed,
in six decades of cases before Salazar, the U.S. Supreme Court had struck
down the use of religious symbols in public schools, along with prayers, Bible
reading, and religious instruction.33 A number of European nations besides
Italy have done the same.34 This might suggest that, with Lautsi, European and
American laws of religious freedom are actually moving closer together rather
than further apart. And it might further suggest that the Lautsi case, despite its
strong language of secularity and laïcité, may be restricted in its application to
public schools, rather than becoming a step on the slippery slope toward the
greater secularization of Europe that some critics fear. After all, despite the
sweeping Constitutional logic of strict separation of church and state35 at work
in many of its religion and public school cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has
rarely used these cases as precedents to strike down overt religious expression,
free exercise accommodations, and church-state cooperation in other areas of
public life.36 Particularly in recent years, the Supreme Court, flush with neofederalist energy, has shown ample deference to the actions of state and local
officials concerning religion when those actions are challenged under the First
Amendment Establishment Clause.37 The European Court of Human Rights
might proceed similarly in limiting the reach of Lautsi to public schools—
particularly given its parallel doctrine to federalism of granting a “margin of
appreciation” to national traditions and practices that are challenged as
violations of the religious freedom guarantees of the European Convention on
Human Rights.38
33 See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 223–40 (3d ed. 2011).
34 See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 16, 1995, 93
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (Ger.) [hereinafter German Crucifix
Case], available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.
php?id=615 (translating a classroom crucifix case) (ruling against crucifixes in Bavarian public schools). See
generally RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: STUDY OF COMPARATIVE LAW (José Luiz Martinez
López-Muniz et al. eds., 2006) (discussing European education and religious liberty issues).
35 See John Witte, Jr., Facts and Fictions About the History of Separation of Church and State, 48 J.
CHURCH & ST. 15, 15–46 (2006).
36 Id.
37 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 33, at 186.
38 See GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 80 (2007); HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 13 (1996).
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The aim of this mini-symposium on “Religious Symbols on Government
Property” is to probe these questions at greater depth. In the balance of this
Article, the authors situate the Lautsi and Salazar cases in the existing case law
of the European Court of Human Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court,
respectively. The Lautsi case, it turns out, is largely one of first impression:
most European Court cases on religious freedom and educational rights to date
have dealt with private expressions of religious dress and ornamentation in
public schools and other public settings.39 The Salazar case, by contrast, is the
last in a three-decade series of convoluted Supreme Court cases.40 It seems to
signal a retreat by the Court to its original position of allowing old religious
symbols to stand on public lands, even while still preventing religious symbols
in public schools.41
In the two Articles that follow, two experts provide an in-depth analysis of
the Lautsi and Salazar cases and the jurisprudential stakes at work in each
case. Adam Linkner, a bright new Constitutional scholar now clerking with a
distinguished federal judge, has followed the Salazar case from the beginning.
He takes note of the conflicting lower federal court treatment of the very issue
on which the Salazar plurality divided—whether a sale of government
property that contains offending religious symbols is permissible under the
First Amendment Establishment Clause.42 The real difficulty with Salazar, he
argues, is that the Supreme Court gave too little guidance to the district court
on remand to determine the Constitutionality of Congress’s land sale.43
Linkner thus cleverly distills the convoluted six decades of Supreme Court
approaches to the Establishment Clause into a more workable and predictable
“insider/outsider” test that he astutely discerns at work even in the multiple
opinions in Salazar.44 First, this test requires a court to judge whether the
“predominant purpose” or intent of the government was to favor, endorse, or
privilege religion.45 This is an “insider” inquiry that considers all the evidence
of what went into the government’s decision and action respecting religion.46
Second, the test requires a court to judge whether an external reasonable
observer would see the primary effect of the government’s action as one that
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

See infra text accompanying notes 128–56.
See infra text accompanying notes 387–89.
See infra text accompanying notes 411–23.
See Linkner, supra note 23, at 57–65.
Id. at 58–59.
See id. at 70–72.
Id. at 59.
Id.
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endorsed religion.47 This is an “outsider” inquiry, one that views the result of
the government’s action in context and determines whether it mostly supports,
favors, or privileges religion over non-religion.48 These are separate inquiries,
Linkner insists; a government action respecting religion should be struck down
if either its predominant purpose or its principal effect is to favor religion.49 In
Linkner’s view, Congress’s land sale was so transparently favorable to religion
that it fails the insider/outsider inquiry.50 In the end, Linkner thinks Salazar is
wrong and the cross should come down. He would likely applaud the recent
case of Trunk v. City of San Diego, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
distinguishing Salazar, ordered the removal of a large cross which was
privately donated to the United States nearly a century ago but now owned by
the federal government—the Ninth Circuit’s concern being that, from an
outsider’s perspective, the primary effect of the cross was to endorse religion.51
Andrea Pin, a distinguished Constitutional law professor at the University
of Padua, has watched the Lautsi case emerge from the very region of Italy
where Pin had been schooled as a child and where he now teaches as a law
professor. Pin provides a close and revealing analysis of the Constitutional
history and cultural battles of Italy concerning religious freedom, the shifting
relationship between the Catholic Church and the Italian state, and the unique
understanding of Italian-style laicità (rather than French-style laïcité).52 Pin
then contrasts the Italian Constitutional law of religious symbolism with the
emerging jurisprudence of religious freedom of the European Court of Human
Rights.53 Pin regards Lautsi as a serious test case that marks the growing
tension between Italy and Europe, between religious traditions and secular
modernity, between a commodious Constitutional concordance of religion and
state and the emerging right of a secularist to veto these carefully calibrated
national arrangements in the name of European religious freedom.54 In the end,
Pin thinks the original Chamber decision of Lautsi is wrong, and the crosses
should remain. He thus applauds the recent Grand Chamber judgment.55

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id.
Id.
See id. at 81–83.
Id. at 92.
See id. passim; Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011).
See Pin, supra note 6, at 110–35.
Id. at 117–20.
See id. at 141–49.
See id. passim.
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Together, these two Articles illustrate some of the complexity of the legal
issues surrounding the place of religious symbols on government land, and
how serious scholars and judges can take opposing views and marshal
reasoned arguments for each of them. It is easy to be cynical about these
cases—treating them as much ado about nothing, or expensive hobbyhorses for
cultural killjoys and public interest litigants to ride. But that view
underestimates the extraordinary luxury we now enjoy in the West to be able to
fight our cultural contests over religious symbols in courts and academies,
rather than on the streets and battlefields. In centuries past in the West, and in
many regions of the world still today, disputes over religious symbols often
lead to violence, sometimes to all-out warfare.56 For religious and cultural
symbols often embrace and evoke deep personal and communal emotions.
Think of what happens when someone attacks or defaces an icon, a flag, the
grave of a loved one, or the memorial of a fallen hero. Far more is thus at stake
in these cross cases than the fate of a couple of pieces of wood nailed together.
These cases are essential forums in which to work through our deep cultural
differences and to sort out peaceably which traditions and practices should
continue and which should change.
I. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Lautsi is largely a case of first impression, though it draws on several lines
of cases. In this Part, we review the basic provisions on point in the European
Convention on Human Rights and the procedures used by the European Court
of Human Rights in adjudicating claims arising under the Convention. We
review the relevant cases on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and
on the rights to education and free expression. At the end of each Subpart
below, we briefly sort through how these precedents can be marshaled to
support both sides of the Lautsi case now before the Grand Chamber.
A. Provisions and Procedures
A major instrument of the Council of Europe, the 1950 European
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or “Convention”) is binding upon all

56 See RENÉ GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED (1977); Samuel Azariah, The Violence of Religious
Intolerance, WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/jpc/echoes/echoes-18-06.html
(last visited Apr. 2, 2011).
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forty-seven of the current member states.57 The European Court of Human
Rights (“Court” or “European Court”), reformed in 1998,58 is the principal
interpreter of the Convention.59 It is a daily operating and fully functioning
supervisory body, staffed with forty-seven judges, representing each member
state, along with some 640 clerks.60 The Court’s principal task is to hear cases
that determine whether the member states are violating the rights guaranteed in
the Convention.61 Since 1998, any party under the jurisdiction of a European
member state has standing to claim a violation of rights under the Convention
and file a claim directly with the Court.62 However, the Court has frequently
stated that it is not a court of last appeal that can supplant national judicial
remedies.63
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights is the major
provision on religious freedom.64 It guarantees that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public
or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,
practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
65
and freedoms of others.

57 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 46, opened for
signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights] (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953).
58 See generally Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, opened for signature May 11, 1994,
E.T.S. 155 [hereinafter Protocol 11] (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998) (amending the European Convention on
Human Rights).
59 Id. art. 19.
60 See Role of the Registry, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/
The+Court/How+the+Court+works/The+Registry (last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
61 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE COURT IN BRIEF (2010), available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF074FE4-96C2-4384-BFF6-404AAF5BC585/0/Brochure_en_bref_EN.pdf.
62 Id.
63 See NINA-LOUISA AROLD, THE LEGAL CULTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 31
(2007) (analyzing the Court’s general workings and relationships with member states).
64 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 57, art. 9.
65 Id. art. 9.
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The European Court has made clear that religious freedom “entails, inter alia,
freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise
a religion.”66 It has also made clear that Article 9(2) of the ECHR is an
exhaustive list of the grounds on which any government official may impose
limitations on religious freedom.67
Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention supplements the
religious freedom guarantee of Article 9 in cases of education.68 Article 2
provides: “No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of
any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the
State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.”69 Article
14 of the Convention further prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion.70
And Article 10 protects freedom of expression, which can include religious
and anti-religious expression.71
Religious freedom cases arising under Article 9 are relatively few
compared to other areas of human rights.72 From 1959 to 2009, the European
Court of Human Rights (and its predecessors) found a total of thirty violations
of this Article,73 five of them occurring in 2009 alone.74 By comparison, during

66

Buscarini v. San Marino, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 605, 616.
DAVID J. HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE & COLIN WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 435 (2d ed. 2009); THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 768 (Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006).
68 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2,
opened for signature Mar. 3, 1952, E.T.S. 009 [hereinafter Protocol 1] (entered into force May 18, 1954).
69 Id.
70 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 57, art. 14 (“The enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.”).
71 Id. art. 10(1) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers.”).
72 See Nina-Louisa Arold, Promoting Normative Cracks in the Surface: Strasbourg Changing Swedish
Legal Culture, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: NORDIC PERSPECTIVES 275, 278 (Lisbet
Christoffersen et al. eds., 2010).
73 PUB. RELATIONS UNIT, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 50 YEARS OF ACTIVITY: THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS—SOME FACTS AND FIGURES 15 (2010) [hereinafter 50 YEARS OF ACTIVITY],
available
at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ACD46A0F-615A-48B9-89D6-8480AFCC29FD/0/
FactsAndFiguresENAvril2010.pdf.
74 PUB. RELATIONS UNIT, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, VIOLATION BY ARTICLE AND BY
COUNTRY 2 (2009), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/E8F73EC8-AF6A-4205-BAF2F6043F67F651/0/Tableau_de_violations_2009_ENG.pdf.
67
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that same forty-year period, the Court found some 4008 violations of Article 6
concerning the fairness and length of proceedings,75 and the Court has close to
140,000 pending applications.76 While religious freedom cases are small in
number, violations of Article 9 are still burning issues,77 keeping Europe’s
judges busy and probably giving them headaches.
By repeatedly finding violations by individual member states, the European
Court has induced changes in many domestic legal systems of member states.
Those changes have prompted a growing awareness of other possible human
rights claims; that fact, together with an increase in the number of member
states, has resulted in a flood of applications to the Court.78 To manage this
swollen docket, Protocol 14 now gives judges the discretion to restrict
themselves to cases alleging “significant” violations.79 Chambers of seven
judges, selected from among the forty-seven sitting judges, decide most
cases.80 These seven judges often are a balanced representation of the legal
cultures represented among the forty-seven member states.81

75 50 YEARS OF ACTIVITY, supra note 73, at 15 (noting 4008 cases that concerned length of proceedings
and an additional 3207 cases that concerned the right to a fair and timely trial under Article 6 of the ECHR
between 1959 and 2009).
76 See PUB. RELATIONS UNIT, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PENDING APPLICATIONS
ALLOCATED TO A JUDICIAL FORMATION (2010), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/99F89D38902E-4725-9D3D-4A8BB74A7401/0/Pending_applications_chart.pdf (in December 2010, there were 139,650
pending applications).
77 See generally Brett G. Scharffs, Symposium Introduction: The Freedom of Religion and Belief
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Legal, Moral, Political and Religions Perspectives, 26
J.L. & RELIGION 249 (2010).
78 But see PUB. RELATIONS UNIT, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, STATISTICS 2010 (2010),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/8699082A-A7B9-47E2-893F-5685A72B78FB/0/Statistics_
2010.pdf (discussing that between 1959 and 2009, the Court delivered a total of 12,198 judgments, while
between January and September 2010, it produced 1442 judgments and 24,321 admissibility decisions).
79 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 57, art. 35 (“The Court shall declare inadmissible
any individual application . . . if it considers that: . . . (b) the applicant has not suffered a significant
disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires
an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground
which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.”).
80 PUB. RELATIONS UNIT, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS 6 (2010)
[hereinafter THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS], available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/5C53ADA480F8-42CB-B8BD-CBBB781F42C8/0/FAQ_COUL_ENG_A5_OCT2010.pdf.
81 See AROLD, supra note 63, at 55 (discussing the influence of different legal traditions that the judges
share on the Court).
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Within three months of a chamber judgment any of the parties can request a
referral to a Grand Chamber.82 This constitutes an internal appellate review,
and involves seventeen judges of the European Court.83 The Italian
government in Lautsi invoked this mechanism.84 While, politically, the
banning of Christian crucifixes in Italian schools might come as a surprise,
both the hybrid legal culture of the European Court of Human Rights85 and the
Court’s prior cases can readily support this decision, even if not ineluctably;
hence, the Grand Chamber review in this case. To protect national traditions,
or issues of special sensitivity in national societies, the Court frequently
invokes the doctrine of a margin of appreciation.86 That doctrine recognizes
that national judges are often better placed than international judges to assess
these culturally sensitive questions.87 Only if there is a manifest breach of the
European Convention on Human Rights will the Court find a violation.88
When a party claims a violation of Article 9 rights to religious freedom, the
Court will assess: (1) whether there is interference with that right; (2) whether
this interference was based on law; and (3) whether this interference was
necessary in a democratic society.89 It is usually the third step, the balancing
test by the Court, which is the focus of most cases. There the judges analyze
whether the interference corresponds to a pressing social need, is proportionate
to the aim pursued, and is justified by relevant and sufficient reasons.90
Religious beliefs and traditions can be relevant in making these decisions,
even if they are not directly raised in an Article 9 case. A good example is the
European Court case of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria91 regarding an act of
state censorship that was challenged as a violation of Article 10 rights to free

82 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 57, art. 43(1) (“Within a period of three
months from the date of the judgment of the Chamber, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request
that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber.”).
83 THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS, supra note 80, at 6.
84 See supra text accompanying note 14.
85 See AROLD, supra note 63, at 55.
86 The margin of appreciation is frequently used by the Court. See YOUROW, supra note 38, at 24
(providing an extensive study of the doctrine and describing its development in two time periods: before and
after 1979). The doctrine’s scope was expanded during the later years. See, e.g., Hatton v. United Kingdom,
2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 189 (concerning flight noise interruptions of sleep); Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976) (concerning obscene publications).
87 See YOUROW, supra note 38, at 13.
88 See id.
89 See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 6, 18 (1993).
90 See id. at 20–22.
91 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994).
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expression.92 The case concerned the seizure and ban of a movie ridiculing the
Holy Family that was slated to be shown at an art institute in Tyrol, Austria.93
Using the margin of appreciation doctrine, the European Court judges found
these state restrictions on the film to be justified.94 The Court determined that
the national authorities of Austria were better able to discern the cultural trends
and moral sensitivities of the Tyrol region of Austria.95 While the Court
recognized that Article 10 rights to freedom of expression encouraged a
pluralism of religious and non-religious beliefs, these values had to yield in
this case to the state’s concern about ideas that would strongly offend and
attack the religious beliefs of a traditionally Catholic region that cherished the
Holy Family.96 Here, the margin of appreciation doctrine was used to defer to a
national court’s protection of local Christian sensibilities and traditions.97 This
is an important precedent for Italy in the Lautsi case—though Otto-PremingerInstitut is an Article 10 case dealing with freedom of expression, not an Article
9 case dealing with freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
B. Manifestations of Belief: What Gets Article 9 Protection?
The display of a belief through symbols combines concerns both about
“religion” and “manifestation” of religion under Article 9. The European Court
interprets “religion” broadly, but when it comes to “manifestation” not every
action driven by religious belief is recognized and/or protected under Article 9.
Three cases illustrate the range of treatment by the Court. In Pretty v. United
Kingdom,98 the European Court held that a husband’s act of assisting the
suicide of his terminally-ill wife was not a religious manifestation or act
protected under Article 9, even if done on grounds of humanity and dignity.99
The husband could not accordingly claim a religious freedom exemption from
English criminal prohibitions on assisting suicide.100 In Cha’are Shalom Ve
Tzedek v. France,101 the Court found that while Jewish ritual slaughtering in
general was a religious manifestation or practice deserving presumptive
protection under Article 9, a state prohibition on a certain form of ritual
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 19–21.
Id. at 20–21.
Id.
Id.
Pretty v United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 255.
See id. at 281–82.
See id.
Cha’are Shalom Ve Tzedek v. France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 231.
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slaughtering, deemed cruel to animals, was justified under Article 9, especially
since an alternative supply of kosher meat was available from a neighboring
state.102 In Kokkinakis v. Greece,103 the Court found that proselytism or
evangelization was a religious manifestation protected by Article 9, and that
the state was not justified in imposing criminal sanctions on a peaceable
proselytizer.104
In a subsequent case of proselytism, Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v.
Russia,105 the Court restated how vital freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion is for the democratic society:
[A]s enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and
religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the
meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of
the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers
and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists,
agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable
from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the
centuries, depends on it. While religious freedom is primarily a
matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom to
“manifest [one’s] religion” alone and in private or in community with
others, in public and within the circle of those whose faith one shares.
Since religious communities traditionally exist in the form of
organised structures, Article 9 must be interpreted in the light of
Article 11 of the Convention, which safeguards associative life
against unjustified State interference. Seen in that perspective, the

102

Id. at 259.
Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 6 (1993). The Kokkinakis Court made clear that,
while unjustified in this case, general restrictions on religious manifestations can be necessary to protect the
pluralism of a society:
103

The fundamental nature of the rights guaranteed in Article 9 para. 1 (art. 9-1) is also reflected in
the wording of the paragraph providing for limitations on them. Unlike the second paragraphs of
Articles 8, 10 and 11 (art. 8-2, art. 10-2, art. 11-2) which cover all the rights mentioned in the
first paragraphs of those Articles (art. 8-1, art. 10-1, art. 11-1), that of Article 9 (art. 9-1) refers
only to “freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief[.]” In so doing, it recognises that in
democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same population, it
may be necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the
various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.
Id. at 18.
104 Id.
105 Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/
Homepage_EN (follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing
“Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow” in the “Case Title” box and “Russia” in the “Respondent State” box)
(currently pending for referral to the Grand Chamber).
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right of believers to freedom of religion, which includes the right to
manifest one’s religion in community with others, encompasses the
expectation that believers will be allowed to associate freely, without
arbitrary State intervention. Indeed, the autonomous existence of
religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic
society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which
Article 9 affords. The State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality, as
defined in the Court’s case-law, is incompatible with any power on
106
the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs.

None of these cases dealt directly with whether a professed secularist has
the right to be free from observing a government’s display of religious symbols
in a public school. But these cases do make clear that religious freedom for
all—even for atheists and agnostics—is a cherished right in a democratic
society, and states must have strong and stated reasons and proportionate
methods to regulate or limit this right.
C. Religious and Non-Religious School Curricula
Two recent school cases come closer to the issues of Lautsi. In Folgerø v.
Norway107 and Grzelak v. Poland,108 the Court dealt with forms of religious
instruction in public schools that were challenged by professed atheists and
agnostics.109 Folgerø concerned Norway’s new law that required all public
grade school and middle school students to take a course in “Christianity,
Religion and Philosophy” (“KRL”).110 The law provided no full exemption for
non-Christian students.111 A student, whose parents were professed atheists,
objected that this curricular requirement violated the rights to education
guaranteed by Article 2.112 The European Court agreed.113 It found that the
state had not tailored its new law carefully enough to deal with students with
different religious and non-religious sensibilities:114
106

Id. para. 99 (citations omitted).
Folgerø v. Norway, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007) [hereinafter Folgerø], http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/
Homepage_EN (follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing
“Folgerø” in the “Case Title” box and “Norway” in the “Respondent State” box).
108 Grzelak v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) [hereinafter Grzelak], http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/
Homepage_EN (follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing
“Grzelak” in the “Case Title” box and “Poland” in the “Respondent State” box).
109 Id. paras. 6–25; Folgerø, supra note 107, para. 3.
110 Folgerø, supra note 107, para. 3.
111 Id. para. 30.
112 Id.
113 Id. para. 102.
114 Id.
107
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[N]otwithstanding the many laudable legislative purposes stated in
connection with the introduction of the KRL subject in the ordinary
primary and lower secondary schools, it does not appear that the
respondent State took sufficient care that information and knowledge
included in the curriculum be conveyed in an objective, critical and
pluralistic manner for the purposes of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the refusal to grant the applicant
parents full exemption from the KRL subject for their children gave
115
rise to a violation of Article 2.

Three years later, in Grzelak, a public grade school student in Poland, with
agnostic parents, was properly exempted from mandatory religion classes in
accordance with Folgerø.116 But the student’s only alternative to attending the
religion classes was to spend unsupervised time in the school hallway, library,
or club.117 His parents wanted him enrolled in an alternative course in secular
ethics.118 The school refused to offer such a special course, on grounds of
having insufficient teachers, students, and funds.119 The school further marked
the student’s report card with a blank for “religion/ethics,” and calculated his
cumulative grade point average based on fewer credit hours.120 The Court
found both these state actions to be in violation of both Article 9 and Article 14
of the Convention, for “[it] brings about a situation in which individuals are
obliged—directly or indirectly—to reveal that they are non-believers. This is
all the more important when such obligation occurs in the context of the
provision of an important public service such as education.”121
The Court considers that the absence of a mark for “religion/ethics”
would be understood by any reasonable person as an indication that
[this student] did not follow religious education classes, which were
widely available, and that he was thus likely to be regarded as a
person without religious beliefs . . . and distinguishes the persons
concerned from those who have a mark for the subject. This finding
takes on particular significance in respect of a country like Poland
where the great majority of the population owe allegiance to one
particular religion.
....

115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id.
Grzelak, supra note 108, para. 7.
Id.
Id. paras. 7, 12.
Id. paras. 12, 19.
Id. paras. 21–25.
Id. para. 87.
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. . . [T]he Court finds that the absence of a mark for “religion/ethics”
on the [student’s] school certificates throughout the entire period of
his schooling amounted to a form of unwarranted
122
stigmatisation . . . .

These cases come closer to Lautsi in that they deal with state impositions of
religion on public school students—directly in the case of Folgerø, indirectly
in the case of Grzelak. Neither is a straightforward Article 9 case. Folgerø is
about Article 2 rights to education free from religious influence;123 Grzelak
combines Article 9 with Article 14 restrictions on religious discrimination.124
Nonetheless, the Court stretched far in both these cases to protect the religious
freedom rights of atheistic and agnostic public school students and their
parents.125 And it included within the right of religious freedom (and related
rights of education and non-discrimination) the right of a person to be free
from state impositions of religion and even from indirect costs that come from
avoiding the state’s religious offerings.126 Lautsi is still distinguishable: it is
not about active curricular instruction in religion, but the passive display of a
crucifix that the student will encounter in many other walks of Italian public
and private life as well.127 But these cases are important precedents for Lautsi
and her children.
D. School Dress Codes and Headscarves
In three other cases, the Court dealt with direct Article 9 religious freedom
claims by Muslim women to wear headscarves in manifestation of their
religion but contrary to public school dress codes.128 In each case, the Court
held for the state, holding that the state’s interest in protecting the “secularity”
of the school in a democratic society was a sufficient ground to justify its
prohibitions on headscarves.129 In each case, the Court granted a margin of

122

Id. paras. 95, 99 (citation omitted).
Folgerø, supra note 107, paras. 53–102.
124 Grzelak, supra note 108, paras. 49–101.
125 See id. paras. 84–101; Folgerø, supra note 107, paras. 85–105.
126 See Folgerø, supra note 107, paras. 66–67; Grzelak, supra note 108, paras. 85–99.
127 Lautsi I, supra note 1, para. 7.
128 Dogru v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) [hereinafter Dogru], http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/
Homepage_EN (follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing
“Dogru” in the “Case Title” box and “France” in the “Respondent State” box); Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur.
Ct. H.R. 173; Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447.
129 Dogru, supra note 128, paras. 75, 78; Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 205–06; Dahlab, 2001-V Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 463–64.
123
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appreciation to the state to decide this culturally sensitive issue of headscarf
regulations in accordance with its own traditions of secularism.130
In Dahlab v. Switzerland,131 a state elementary school teacher, newly
converted to the Islamic faith from Catholicism, was banned from wearing a
headscarf when she taught her classes.132 The government highlighted the
value of maintaining secularism in a public school that was open to young
students from various traditions.133 Invoking the margin of appreciation
doctrine, the Court found this school dress code and its application to Dahlab
to be necessary and proportionate, and dismissed her claim that the state had
violated her freedom of thought, conscience, and religion under Article 9.134
The Court stressed
that it is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful external
symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf may have on the freedom
of conscience and religion of very young children. The applicant’s
pupils were aged between four and eight, an age at which children
wonder about many things and are also more easily influenced than
older pupils. In those circumstances, it cannot be denied outright that
the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising
effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a precept
which is laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court
noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It
therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic
headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above
all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic
society must convey to their pupils.
Accordingly, weighing the right of a teacher to manifest her
religion against the need to protect pupils by preserving religious
harmony, the Court considers that, in the circumstances of the case
and having regard, above all, to the tender age of the children for
whom the applicant was responsible as a representative of the State,
the Geneva authorities did not exceed their margin of appreciation
135
and that the measure they took was therefore not unreasonable.

130

Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 463; Dogru, supra note 128, para. 75; Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.

at 208.
131
132
133
134
135

Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447.
Id. at 451–52.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 463.
Id.
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In Dogru v. France,136 a Muslim girl refused to follow her public school’s
dress code that required her to take off her headscarf during physical education
classes and sports events.137 Dismayed by the breach of its rules and the
tensions it caused among the other students, the school initiated disciplinary
actions against her.138 When she persisted in her claim to wear her headscarf in
all public settings, the school offered to teach her through a correspondence
program, an option that her parents rejected.139 She was then expelled from the
school.140 After losing in the French courts, she claimed violations of her
Article 2 and Article 9 rights under the Convention.141 The European Court
again held for the state, and again accorded France an ample margin of
appreciation for its policy of maintaining a secular ethic in its public
schools.142
Where questions concerning the relationship between State and
religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may
reasonably differ widely, the role of the national decision-making
body must be given special importance. This will notably be the case
when it comes to regulating the wearing of religious symbols in
educational institutions, in respect of which the approaches taken in
Europe are diverse. Rules in this sphere will consequently vary from
one country to another according to national traditions and the
requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms
143
of others and to maintain public order.

In the most famous headscarf case, Şahin v. Turkey,144 an Islamic medical
student at Istanbul University was forbidden to take certain courses and exams
because she was wearing a headscarf contrary to state rules governing dress.145
The University brought disciplinary actions against her.146 After losing in the
Turkish courts, she filed a claim before the European Court of Human Rights
alleging a violation of her Article 9 rights.147 The Court held for Turkey, and

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Dogru, supra note 128.
Id. para. 7.
Id. para. 8.
See id. paras. 11–12.
Id. para. 8.
Id. paras. 1, 2, 12–46.
Id. para. 75.
Id. para. 63 (citation omitted).
Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 179–80, 182–83.
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again granted a margin of appreciation to the Turkish constitutional and
cultural ideals of gender equality and state secularism.148
The principle of secularism was inspired by developments in
Ottoman society in the period between the nineteenth century and the
proclamation of the Republic. The idea of creating a modern public
society in which equality was guaranteed to all citizens without
distinction on grounds of religion, denomination or sex had already
been mooted in the Ottoman debates of the nineteenth century.
Significant advances in women’s rights were made during this period
(equality of treatment in education, the introduction of a ban on
polygamy in 1914, the transfer of jurisdiction in matrimonial cases to
the secular courts that had been established in the nineteenth
century).
The defining feature of the Republican ideal was the presence of
women in public life and their active participation in society.
Consequently, the ideas that women should be freed from religious
constraints and that society should be modernised had a common
149
origin.

The Court further noted that Turkish national law clearly bans veils and
headscarves from schools and public workplaces, and these bans had been
upheld many times by the Turkish Constitutional Court.150 The European Court
then discussed the different practices of European states concerning religious
symbols and headscarves in order to assess whether there was a common
European standard on the issue that could be enforced uniformly.151 There was
none.152 Only Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia at the time had explicit
regulations concerning Islamic headscarves in a university.153 France, “where
secularism is regarded as one of the cornerstones of republican values,”
prohibits persons from wearing headscarves, yarmulkes, and oversized crosses
in its state schools.154 In seven other countries, including Germany and the
United Kingdom, Muslim public school and university students were allowed
to wear headscarves.155

148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Id. at 180, 205–08.
Id. at 185–86.
Id. at 187–89.
Id. at 192–94.
See id.
Id. at 192.
Id.
Id. at 192–94.
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In the absence of a clear European consensus on the regulation of
headscarves, the European Court was left to build on its own case law about
how much religious freedom to protect and how much national regulation of
religion to respect. Those precedents, the Şahin court concluded, called for an
ample margin of appreciation to local practices, which the Court granted to
Turkey:
In democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one
and the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on
freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in order to reconcile the
interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are
respected.
....
Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a
“democratic society.” Although individual interests must on occasion
be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply
mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance
must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of
people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.
Pluralism and democracy must also be based on dialogue and a spirit
of compromise necessarily entailing various concessions on the part
of individuals or groups of individuals which are justified in order to
maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society.
Where these “rights and freedoms” are themselves among those
guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols, it must be accepted
that the need to protect them may lead States to restrict other rights or
freedoms likewise set forth in the Convention. It is precisely this
constant search for a balance between the fundamental rights of each
individual which constitutes the foundation of a “democratic
society[.]”
Where questions concerning the relationship between State
and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society
may reasonably differ widely, the role of the national decisionmaking body must be given special importance. This will notably be
the case when it comes to regulating the wearing of religious symbols
in educational institutions, especially . . . in view of the diversity of
the approaches taken by national authorities on the issue. It is not
possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the
significance of religion in society . . . and the meaning or impact of
the public expression of a religious belief will differ according to
time and context. Rules in this sphere will consequently vary from
one country to another according to national traditions and the
requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms
of others and to maintain public order. Accordingly, the choice of the
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extent and form such regulations should take must inevitably be left
up to a point to the State concerned, as it will depend on the specific
156
domestic context.

In the “specific domestic context” of Turkey, “secularism” is “one of the
fundamental principles of the Turkish state.”157 This principle is “in harmony
with the rule of law and respect for human rights [and] may be considered
necessary to protect the democratic system in Turkey.”158 Religious “attitudes”
and actions to the contrary “will not enjoy the protection of Article 9 of the
Convention.”159 Hence by a sixteen to one vote, the Grand Chamber found in
favor of Turkey.160
Only Judge Tulkens dissented, arguing that the majority was using the
margin of appreciation doctrine to abdicate its responsibility to protect
fundamental rights.161 The vital issues of religious freedom at stake in this case
are not merely “a ‘local’ issue,” she argued, “but one of importance to all the
member States. European [Court] supervision cannot, therefore, be escaped
simply by invoking the margin of appreciation.”162
On what grounds was the interference with the applicant’s right to
freedom of religion through the ban on wearing the headscarf based?
In the present case, relying exclusively on the reasons cited by the
national authorities and courts, the majority put forward, in general
and abstract terms, two main arguments: secularism and equality.
While I fully and totally subscribe to each of these principles, I
disagree with the manner in which they were applied here and to the
way they were interpreted in relation to the practice of wearing the
headscarf. In a democratic society, I believe that it is necessary to
seek to harmonise the principles of secularism, equality and liberty,
163
not to weigh one against the other.

While these three cases do not treat the government’s own use of religious
symbols, they are nonetheless important precedents for both sides of the Lautsi
case. These cases can be used to support Lautsi’s claim to religious freedom
and non-discrimination for herself and her children. The only way they can
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id. at 203–04 (emphases added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 204–06.
Id. at 205–06.
Id.
Id. at 217.
See id. at 221–22 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 222.
Id. at 221–22.
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enjoy true “equality” and “liberty” in Italy as a religious minority, the
argument goes, is for the state to embrace the principle of “secularism” and to
remove those symbols and end those practices that privilege and reflect the
dominant Catholic faith. Particularly in the context of a state school, where
children are learning the fundamentals of democracy and freedom for all, even
the passive display of a symbol that is overtly Christian and perennially present
in the classroom violates the mandates of secularism.
Secularism, the argument continues, is the only common feature that binds
together the potpourri of European traditions—Catholic Italy, Ireland, and
Poland, Protestant Sweden and Norway, Anglican England, Muslim Turkey,
Orthodox Greece and Romania, and the large number of atheists in former
Socialist countries.164 In accepting the European Convention on Human
Rights,165 these countries are also accepting the principle of secularism
embedded within it. The only way to ensure that each member state abides by
its commitment to human rights, and to the principles of secularity and
neutrality that human rights demand, is to ban religious symbols on
government land, particularly in public schools—whether those symbols are
put there by the state or brought there by a private party. Especially a
“powerful external symbol” like the headscarf, as the Dahlab Court noted, can
be understood as a threat to “the message of tolerance, respect for others, and
above all, equality and non-discrimination.”166 It is best to ban all these
religious symbols in public life. Combine the solicitude for the religious
freedom claims of atheists and agnostics in Folgerø and Grzelak167 against
state imposition of religion with the clarion call for state secularism in Dahlab,
Dogru,168 and Şahin, the argument concludes, and Lautsi and her children
should win.
The real issue, Italy might counter, is whether the European Court is
sincere about granting a margin of appreciation to national tribunals on
culturally “sensitive” issues in which no “European consensus” exists.169 Or is
the Court simply using the margin of appreciation doctrine as a pretext to
establishing secularism throughout Europe, even in countries like Italy that
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See id. at 192–94 (majority opinion).
Id. at 205–06.
166 Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 463.
167 See generally Folgerø, supra note 107, paras. 51–57, 86; Grzelak, supra note 108.
168 See generally Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447; Dogru, supra note 128; Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 173.
169 See Lautsi I, supra note 1, paras. 38–41.
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reject it. Europe, after all, has no consensus about the mandates of secularism,
and nothing in the European Convention commands secularism as a condition
for respecting the human rights of all,170 whatever the Court’s imaginings to
the contrary. Moreover, Europe has no consensus about the propriety of
religious symbols on government land or in government buildings. These are
highly sensitive local issues in ancient religious cultures like Italy that are
gradually moving on their own terms and their own timetable toward ever
greater pluralism.
Moreover, why would the European Court reject strong Article 9 claims by
sincere good faith Muslims, engaged in mainstream religious practices that run
contrary to new national policies of secularism, yet grant Article 9 claims of a
secularist who has only recently emigrated to Italy with her children but now
objects to the vestiges of ancient traditions of Christianity? Why should young
students—controlled by secularist parents—get full religious freedom
protection against even indirect forms of majoritarian religion, while sincere,
good faith Muslim adults cannot get the religious freedom to wear unobtrusive
headscarves while enjoying their rights to education? The European Court has
painted itself into a secularist corner, the argument for Italy would conclude,
forgetting the true meaning of religious freedom.
E. Freedom of Expression
In Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, the European Court used the margin
of appreciation doctrine to defer to Austria’s traditions of Christianity, even in
the face of a strong Article 10 claim to freedom of expression to show an
offensive anti-religious film.171 That case used the margin of appreciation
doctrine in a way favorable to Italy’s argument in Lautsi.
Another Article 10 case, Vajnai v. Hungary,172 can also be seen as helpful
to Italy. A politician of a left wing party, during a public demonstration in
Hungary, wore a five-pointed red star, the infamous symbol of the Communist
era.173 He was convicted for wearing a totalitarian symbol in public.174 He filed
a claim in the European Court, claiming a violation of his Article 10 rights to
170

See id. para. 41.
See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text.
172 Vajnai v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN (follow “CaseLaw” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Vajnai” in the “Case Title” box
and “Hungary” in the “Respondent State” box).
173 Id. para. 6.
174 Id. paras. 7–8.
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freedom of expression.175 The Court held in the politician’s favor.176 The Court
took special note of Hungary’s history after its political transformation:
[A]lmost two decades have elapsed from Hungary’s transition to
pluralism and the country has proved to be a stable democracy . . . . It
has become a Member State of the European Union, after its full
integration into the value system of the Council of Europe and the
Convention. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that there is a
real and present danger of any political movement or party restoring
the Communist dictatorship. The Government has not shown the
existence of such a threat prior to the enactment of the ban in
177
question.

Not only was the blanket ban unjustified, it was also too broad, because it
required no proof that the defendant identified with the ideas that the star
represented:
The ban can encompass activities and ideas which clearly belong to
those protected by Article 10, and there is no satisfactory way to
sever the different meanings of the incriminated symbol. Indeed, the
relevant Hungarian law does not attempt to do so. Moreover, even if
such distinctions had existed, uncertainties might have arisen
entailing a chilling effect on freedom of expression and self178
censorship.

While the Court recognized the deep scar that Communism had left on
Hungary, the judges held that there was no longer a sufficient social need to
criminalize the star that symbolized the former Communist regime.179
[T]he applicant’s conviction for the mere fact that he had worn a red
star cannot be considered to have responded to a “pressing social
need.” Furthermore, the measure with which his conduct was
sanctioned, although relatively light, belongs to the criminal law
sphere, entailing the most serious consequences. The Court does not
consider that the sanction was proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued. It follows that the interference with the applicant’s freedom
of expression cannot be justified under Article 10 § 2 of the
180
Convention.
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Id. para. 49 (citation omitted).
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While the scope and standard of Article 9 and Article 10 of the Convention
are certainly different, the Vajnai case has some modest bearing on the Lautsi
case. In favor of Italy, the case recognizes that once offensive symbols in
public life can lose their sting over time, and become accepted parts of a
pluralistic culture that is teeming with countervailing symbols of all sorts.181
Only two decades after the fall of Communism, the signature red star of the
Communist regime was now deemed an acceptable part of public life, even if
the star reminded many observers of prior oppression and political abuse, and
even if the star was worn by a political official.182 Wearing the star may be in
bad taste, but the issue for the Vajnai court was whether wearing the star
represented “a real and present danger” of a return to Communism, which it
clearly did not.183 Italy can make a comparable argument respecting its
crucifixes, and how passage of time has rendered them acceptable parts of a
pluralistic culture. These crucifixes are not harbingers of a return to Catholic
establishments, nor do they signal a “real and present danger” that the
democracy of Italy is about to fall to Catholic rule. Moreover, the offenses with
which the crucifixes may have been associated in prior centuries of crusades,
pogroms, and inquisitions have long since ended184—much longer than the
offenses associated with the Communist red star, which many Hungarian
citizens today can still remember. While the crucifixes may offend a few
members of society, like Lautsi and her children, they represent cherished
cultural values to many millions of others. Lautsi’s views, in fact, cause
offense to millions of members of Italian society, but those views cannot be
censored for that reason alone. Freedom of expression requires that all views
be heard in public life, and no one should enjoy a heckler’s veto.
The counterargument for Lautsi might be that “freedom of expression” is a
right that the individual can claim against the state, not that the state can claim
against the individual. The further counterargument might be that these
crucifixes are not one of sundry symbols in public life, but are a distinctive part
of the public school classroom which the state compels children to attend. And
this case is about freedom of expression, not freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion.
As the foregoing survey of cases illustrates, the Grand Chamber in the
Lautsi case has a wide range of arguments at its disposal. Interestingly, as we
181
182
183
184
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See id.
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will note in the Conclusion, the Grand Chamber did rather little to distinguish
these precedents or even to deal with them in a serious way. That will leave
plenty of room for argument in subsequent European Court cases on religious
symbols in public life, which will doubtlessly arise in different quarters of
Europe.
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT185
While the U.S. Supreme Court has operated continuously since 1790,186 its
cases on religious symbols in public life and on government land have come
only in the last thirty years.187 All these cases have arisen under the First
Amendment Establishment Clause which, as noted in the Introduction,
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.”188 That Constitutional provision, ratified in 1791,189 was largely a
dead letter for the first 150 years of American history.190 Before 1947, the
Supreme Court heard only two cases directly under the Establishment Clause,
holding for the government each time.191 This changed dramatically in 1947,
when the Court decided the famous case of Everson v. Board of Education.192
Everson for the first time applied the Establishment Clause to state and local
governments, by incorporating it into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.193 Everson also declared that “the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and
state.’”194 This opened the floodgates of litigation; since 1947, the Supreme
Court has heard nearly seventy cases arising in whole or in part under the
Establishment Clause.195
Some two-thirds of these Establishment Clause cases have concerned
education—more particularly, the place of religion in public schools and the

185

See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 33, at 287–94.
Home of the Court, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/
home-of-the-court (last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
187 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 33, at 227–36.
188 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
189 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 33, at 89.
190 See id. at 109–10.
191 Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 82 (1908); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 300 (1899).
192 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
193 Id. at 13–15.
194 Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
195 For a list of cases, see WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 33, at 305–38.
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place of government in religious schools.196 Particularly in its religion and
public school cases, the Court issued its strongest statements that the
Establishment Clause called for a “high and impregnable” wall between church
and state.197 “That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not
approve the slightest breach.”198 The Court used this strict separationist logic
to ban the use of religious teachers, religious officials, Bible readings, studentled prayers, moments of silence, and creationist science from the public school
classroom, and to ban prayers and religious ceremonies even from occasional
public school events like graduation ceremonies and football games.199 In these
cases, the Court also developed a three-part test to apply the First Amendment
Establishment Clause.200 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,201 the Court declared that any
government action challenged under the Establishment Clause would meet
Constitutional muster only if it: (1) had a secular purpose; (2) had a primary
effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion; and (3) fostered no
excessive entanglement between church and state officials.202 This Lemon test,
as it came to be called, was to be used not only in religion and education cases,
but in all cases arising under the Establishment Clause.203
Among the remaining Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases outside
of education was a set of convoluted cases from 1980 to 2010 that raised two
loaded questions: (1) what role may religious officials, ceremonies, and
symbols play in public life; and (2) to what extent may government recognize,
support, fund, house, or participate in these forms and forums of religious
expression?
Cases raising these questions had poured into the lower federal courts
shortly after the Supreme Court issued its Everson case. Litigation groups like
the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, and the Anti-Defamation League filed many of the
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Id. at 223.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
198 Id.
199 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980); Chamberlain v. Dade County, 377 U.S. 402 (1964); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948).
200 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
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lawsuits.204 Their efforts were complemented, if not catalyzed, by the nation’s
growing countercultural movements in the 1960s (think of the hippie
movement, Woodstock, and the Vietnam War protests),205 by a growing antireligious sentiment in the American academy in the 1970s (think of the “God is
dead” movement and the Marxist critiques of religion),206 and by the rise of
religious and cultural minorities whose views found too little place in
majoritarian policies and practices.207 Cultural critics and Constitutional
litigants challenged a number of admixtures of religion and government—
including the presence of religious language, art, and symbols on government
stationery and seals and in public parks and government buildings; the
purchase and display of religious art, music, literature, and statuary in state
museums; governmental recognition of Christian Sundays and holidays; and
others.208
Before 1980, few of these cases made much headway in the lower federal
courts.209 The Supreme Court repeatedly refused to hear these cases on appeal,
save a small cluster of cases in 1961 challenging traditional Sabbath day laws,
which got nowhere.210 After 1980, however, the Court took on several cases on
state-supported displays of religious symbols.211 These cases divided (and
continue to divide) the Court deeply, yielding wildly discordant approaches to
the Establishment Clause and bitter dissenting opinions from several of the
Justices, notably Justices Scalia, Souter, and Stevens.212
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210 See generally Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (holding that a statute disallowing sales on
Sunday does not violate free exercise rights of Jewish appellant, who is a strict Saturday Sabbatarian);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (holding that a Sunday closing law
does not violate free exercise rights of owner of kosher Jewish supermarket, Orthodox Jewish customers, or
rabbis with a duty to inspect kosher markets per Jewish dietary laws); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961) (upholding a state law proscribing certain business and commercial activity on Sunday against
Establishment Clause challenge); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961)
(holding Sunday closing laws do not violate the Establishment Clause).
211 See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125
(2009); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545
U.S. 844 (2005); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); County of
Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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A. Religious Symbols in Public Schools
Stone v. Graham was the Supreme Court’s first case to deal directly with
the Constitutionality of religious symbols on government property.213 This
was, in fact, another religion and public school case.214 The Stone Court struck
down a state statute that authorized posting a plaque bearing the Ten
Commandments (or Decalogue) on the wall of each public school
classroom.215 Private groups in the community donated and hung the
plaques.216 The Commandments were not read publicly, nor did teachers or
school officials mention or endorse them.217 Each plaque also bore a small
inscription that sought to immunize it from charges of religious establishment:
“‘The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its
adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the
Common Law of the United States.’”218
Using the Lemon test, the Court struck down these displays as violations of
the Establishment Clause.219 Its per curiam opinion held that the statute
mandating the Decalogue display had no “secular legislative purpose” but was
instead “plainly religious.”220 The Ten Commandments are sacred in Jewish
and Christian circles, the Court reasoned, and they command “the religious
duties of believers.”221 It made no Constitutional difference that the Ten
Commandments were passively displayed rather than formally read aloud or
that they were privately donated rather than purchased with state money.222
The very display of the Decalogue in the public school classroom served only a
religious purpose and was thus per se unconstitutional.223
B. Religious Crèches and Government Support
The next main case dealt with the place of a government-sponsored
religious symbol on private land, and here the Court upheld the display.224 In
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
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Id.
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Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 668 (1984).

WITTE&AROLD GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 9:40 AM

“LIFT HIGH THE CROSS?”

35

Lynch v. Donnelly,225 the Court addressed the Constitutionality of a
government display of a crèche, or manger scene.226 For forty years, officials
in the town of Pawtucket, Rhode Island coordinated with local merchants to
put up a large Christmas display in a private park in the heart of the downtown
shopping area.227 The display had many typical holiday decorations: stuffed
animals, toys, striped poles, a Santa Claus house, a sleigh and reindeer,
cardboard carolers, colored lights, a “Season’s Greetings” sign, and more.228
Embedded in this large display was a manger scene that depicted the Bible’s
account of Christ’s birth.229 It included figurines of Mary, Joseph, and baby
Jesus in a manger, surrounded by animals, shepherds, wise men, and angels.230
The crèche occupied about ten percent of the total holiday display space, and
constituted fifteen percent of all the figurines.231 The city purchased the crèche
forty years before and had since stored and maintained it at little cost.232 Local
taxpayers challenged the display as violating the Establishment Clause.233
The Lynch Court upheld the display.234 “There is an unbroken history of
official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of
religion in American life,” Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority, giving
an ample list of illustrations to show how crèches and other religious symbols
had long been embedded in American culture and experience.235 But there is
another reason to uphold this display, Burger continued, now working through
the three-part Lemon test.236 Crèches, while of undoubted religious significance
to Christians, are merely “passive” parts of “purely secular displays extant at
Christmas,” and they have taken on secular civic purposes and become
embedded in the fabric of society.237 Government acknowledgments of
religion—like these crèches, legislative prayers, and the “In God We Trust”
statements on our coins—are not per se unconstitutional, Justice O’Connor
added in concurrence.238 Instead, they serve “the legitimate secular purposes of
225
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solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and
encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society.”239
The primary effect of displaying the crèche as part of the broader holiday
display is not to advance the Christian religion, Chief Justice Burger continued,
but to “engender[] a friendly community spirit of good will” that “brings
people into the central city, and serves commercial interests and benefits
merchants.”240 Governmental participation in and support of such “‘ceremonial
deism’” is not a form of excessive entanglement with religion and cannot be
assessed “mechanically” or by using “absolutist” tests of establishment.241 “It
is far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the Establishment
Clause on the country.”242
Five years later, in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,243 the Court offered a much closer, if not
“crabbed,” reading of the Establishment Clause to outlaw another public
holiday display that ran for six weeks, from Thanksgiving Day, late in
November, into the new year.244 This display was in the county courthouse
near the “Grand Staircase,” a heavily trafficked area for the many people who
used the county’s offices for licensing, registration, litigation, and the like.245
Almost the entire display was a crèche, featuring the same biblical figurines
displayed in Lynch.246 The tallest figurine was an angel holding a trumpet that
bore a clearly visible sign: “Gloria in Excelsis Deo” (“Give Glory to God in
the Highest”), the Latin words of a familiar Christmas carol.247 A lay Catholic
group donated the crèche and put up a small sign indicating the same.248 The
county had put around the display a small white fence, flanked by two small
pine trees with red bows, and lined with red and white poinsettias.249 For the
three weeks before Christmas, the county had invited local high school choirs
to sing carols at the crèche during lunch, dedicating the musical offerings to
world peace and missing soldiers.250 Local taxpayers sued.251
239
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The County of Allegheny Court struck down this crèche display as violating
the Establishment Clause.252 Justice Blackmun wrote for the plurality, noting
that this display was on a prominent piece of government land, not in a private
park like the Lynch display.253 This display was almost exclusively religious in
content and not buffered by ample secular accoutrements of comparable size
and genre.254 And this display carried a single, undiluted verbal message—
enjoining viewers to give glory to God in the highest.255 Taken together,
Justice Blackmun concluded, these factors had the fatal effect of primarily
advancing or endorsing the Christian religion to the exclusion of all other
faiths.256
The same County of Allegheny Court, however, upheld the public display
of a menorah, the eight-armed candleholder symbolizing the Jewish holiday of
Hanukkah.257 The menorah in question was an abstract eighteen-foot design,
privately owned but erected and maintained by the county.258 It was displayed
at a lesser-used entrance to the same courthouse, alongside the city’s fortyfive-foot decorated Christmas tree, which was labeled “A Salute to Liberty.”259
Given its less prominent placement on government land, its abstract design, its
proximity to the larger “Salute to Liberty” tree, its lack of verbal religious
messages, and its use of a symbol (a menorah) that has both religious and
cultural connotations, this display was constitutionally acceptable, Justice
Blackmun concluded.260 The Court did not address the dissonance between
upholding a menorah while simultaneously outlawing a crèche at the same
courthouse, but seemed to suggest that each case turned on the context and the
characterization of the religious symbol.261
C. Private Displays of Religious Symbols in Public Forums
How to characterize a religious symbol arose again six years later, in
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette.262 For more than a
251
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century, Ohio kept open a ten-acre square around the state capitol building for
public gatherings and displays of various sorts.263 Parties who wished to use
the square had to apply and receive a free license from the state.264 In
December, the state invited the community to erect various unattended displays
in this square.265 The state put up its own Christmas tree, and granted a local
rabbi’s application to put up a menorah.266 But the state denied the Ku Klux
Klan’s (“KKK”) application to put up its signature Latin cross.267 The KKK
appealed, charging the state with viewpoint discrimination in violation of its
free speech rights.268 The state countered that allowing the KKK to display its
cross next to the state capitol would be establishing religion.269
The Pinette Court upheld the free speech rights of the KKK and found no
Establishment Clause violation.270 “[A] free-speech clause without religion
would be Hamlet without the prince,” Justice Scalia wrote for the plurality.271
The state created an open public forum in its Capitol Square, and it cannot
discriminatorily exclude religious speech from this forum unless it has a
compelling reason.272 The Court concluded that a general aspiration to avoid
an establishment of religion was not a sufficiently compelling reason to justify
religious discrimination.273 Moreover, the Latin cross was only a private
expression of religion, and no reasonable person would assume that the state
had erected or condoned it—especially since the KKK would prominently
label the cross as its own.274 And, unlike the single crèche display at the grand
staircase in County of Allegheny, this display would be one of several in a
public forum open to anyone who applies.275
Justice Thomas concurred, arguing not only that the Latin cross was a form
of private expression, but also that it was not religious expression.276 For the
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KKK, “[t]he erection of such a cross is a political act, not a Christian one.”277
Its depiction is deeply offensive given the nation’s history of slavery and the
KKK’s history of racism.278 But even offensive speech deserves free speech
protection.279
D. Decalogue Displays on Government Land
The Court’s conflicting messages and methods of dealing with public
displays of religion became even more confusing after its two cases on the
Constitutionality of Ten Commandments displays on government land. In
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky280 and Van
Orden v. Perry,281 announced back-to-back on the same day, two sharply
divided courts struck down one Decalogue display282 but left another
standing.283 In McCreary County, Justice Souter, writing for the majority, used
a strict Lemon analysis to strike down the display, with Stone v. Graham as the
strongest precedent.284 In Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
plurality, ignored Lemon and instead used a soft-history argument to uphold
the display, with Lynch v. Donnelly as the strongest precedent.285 Both cases
featured long and bitter dissents by Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia,
respectively,286 and cacophonies of concurring and dissenting opinions by
other Justices.287 The practical difference in outcome on the Court was
attributable to Justice Breyer, who joined the majority in McCreary County288
and joined in the decision (but not the plurality opinion) in Van Orden.289 In
his concurrence in Van Orden, Justice Breyer described it as a “difficult
borderline case” that called for “the exercise of legal judgment.”290
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287 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 737 (Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 881 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 885 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
288 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 849.
289 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698–706. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
290 Id. at 678 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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McCreary County concerned a Kentucky county’s new display of the Ten
Commandments on a prominent courthouse wall.291 Initially the county
ordered the Decalogue to be hung by itself.292 When the ACLU sued, the
county ordered that the Decalogue be retained but that other governmental
documents be put around the display.293 The county’s new order stated that
“‘the Ten Commandments are codified in Kentucky’s civil and criminal
laws’”; that they were put up “‘in remembrance and honor of Jesus Christ, the
Prince of Ethics’”; and that the “‘Founding Father[s] [had an] explicit
understanding of the duty of elected officials to publicly acknowledge God as
the source of America’s strength and direction.’”294 Almost all the surrounding
governmental documents chosen for the display had the religious language in
them highlighted.295
As the case proceeded through the courts, the county ordered a third
display, without repealing its prior two orders.296 Now the Decalogue on
display was expanded to include the full verses from Exodus 20, and not just a
summary as in the prior exhibits.297 Nine other documents of comparable size
flanked it, including the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the
Bill of Rights, and the Mayflower Compact, and in these documents, more
neutral language was highlighted.298 The collection as a whole was entitled
“The Foundations of American Law and Government Display.”299 Each
document had a comparably-sized description of its historical and legal
significance.300 The Ten Commandments bore this description:
The Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced the formation
of Western legal thought and the formation of our country. That
influence is clearly seen in the Declaration of Independence, which
declared that ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness.’ The Ten Commandments provide the moral
291

McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 850–81.
Id. at 851–52.
293 Id. at 853–54.
294 Id. at 853 (quoting Defendants’ Exhibit 9 in Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss at 1–3, 6, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679 (E.D. Ky. 2000)
(No. Civ. A. 99-507)).
295 Id. at 853–54.
296 Id. at 855–56.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 857.
299 Id. at 856.
300 Id.
292
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background of the Declaration of Independence and the foundation of
301
our legal tradition.

The entire display was on the wall of a heavily trafficked hallway in the county
courthouse.302 The county had initiated and paid for the displays.303
The McCreary County Court struck down this display as a violation of the
Establishment Clause.304 Its fatal feature, in the Court’s judgment, was the lack
of a genuine secular purpose, which both Lemon and Stone required.305 The
Decalogue is a “pervasively religious text” with a clear religious message,
Justice Souter wrote for the majority, even if this text may have had legal or
political uses in the past.306 The county’s stated legislative purpose in putting
up the display was to honor “‘Christ, the Prince of Ethics.’”307 The original text
viewed in its entirety is an unmistakably religious statement dealing with
religious obligations and with morality subject to religious sanction. “When the
government initiates an effort to place this statement alone in public view, a
religious object is unmistakable.”308 That was fatal in Stone, and it must be
fatal here.309
The county’s clumsy attempts to dilute this religious message by relabeling
the Decalogue as a moral code, and displaying other political documents with
their religious passages prominently highlighted, only compounded its
Constitutional error in the eyes of any “reasonable observer,” Justice Souter
continued.310 The purported secular purposes of the county’s final display
“were presented only as a litigating position”311 and did little to offset the
offending religious purpose that had informed the first two displays and the
county’s actions throughout the lawsuit.312 A genuine attempt by government
to cure an inadvertent unconstitutional condition could certainly pass muster
301 Id. at 856 (quoting Application to Petition for Certiorari at 180a, McCreary County v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005)).
302 Id. at 864–65.
303 Id. at 874–75.
304 Id. at 864–75.
305 Id. at 864–65.
306 Id. at 869.
307 Id. at 870 (quoting Defendants’ Exhibit 9 in Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss at 1–3, 6, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679 (E.D. Ky. 2000)
(No. Civ. A. 99-507)).
308 Id. at 869.
309 Id. at 871.
310 Id. at 870.
311 Id. at 871.
312 Id. at 869–74.
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under the Establishment Clause, the McCreary County Court concluded, but no
such genuine attempt existed here.313 Viewed as a whole, and over time, the
county’s actions formed an establishment of religion.314
In Van Orden v. Perry, issued two hours after McCreary County, the Court
took a very different approach.315 This case concerned a six-foot stone
monument of the Decalogue on the state capitol grounds in Austin, Texas.316 A
voluntary civic group, the Fraternal Order of Eagles, had privately donated the
Decalogue forty years earlier.317 It was one of thirty-eight historical markers
and monuments on a twenty-two-acre state capitol campus.318 It was located
near a lesser sidewalk that connected the state capitol with the state Supreme
Court building.319 Van Orden, a state taxpayer who had regularly used the law
library the prior six years, challenged the Decalogue display as a form of
religious establishment.320
The Van Orden Court upheld the display.321 “Our cases, Januslike, point in
two directions,” Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote candidly for the plurality.322
One set of cases “looks toward the strong role played by religion and religious
traditions throughout our Nation’s history.”323 “The other face looks toward the
principle that governmental intervention in religious matters can itself
endanger religious freedom.”324 The Van Orden Court followed the first line of
cases, and declared the Lemon test “not useful”325 in this case. The Decalogue
is clearly a religious text with a religious message, the Court made clear.326 But
“[s]imply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a
religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.”327 The
Decalogue, like many other religious texts and symbols on federal, state, and
local government lands, is also part of “America’s heritage,” part of the fabric

313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327

Id.
Id. at 881.
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 677–92 (2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 677.
Id.
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 685–86.
Id. at 690.
Id.
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of American society.328 Its public display on government land democratically
recognizes and represents that “‘religion has been closely identified with our
history and government’” and that Americans are “‘a religious people, whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.’”329 Moreover, this Decalogue
display was privately donated.330 It stood unchallenged for forty years.331 It is a
merely “passive” display that anyone can easily avoid while walking the state
capitol grounds.332 And its message is buffered by the thirty-seven other
monuments and markers on the same government land, most of which are
decidedly secular.333 If this display is unconstitutional, Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote, then hundreds of others religious displays and maybe even the religious
statues of Moses and Mohammed on a frieze in the Supreme Court building,
must come down.334 That surely is neither the intent nor the import of the First
Amendment Establishment Clause.335
After such a remarkably discordant pair of cases, it was surprising to most
observers that, four years later, the Supreme Court, in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum,336 was unanimous in upholding the Constitutionality of a Ten
Commandments monument on government land.337 The same Fraternal Order
of Eagles in Van Orden had privately donated the monument forty years
earlier.338 It was one of a dozen old signs and markers in a city park in Utah.339
A new religious group, called Summum, sought permission to erect in the park
a monument with their Seven Aphorisms of faith.340 The city refused, so
Summum sued under the First Amendment.341 It charged the city with
violating the Free Speech clause by discriminating against its Seven
Aphorisms.342 It also threatened to charge the city with violating the

328

Id. at 689.
Id. at 683 (quoting Sch. Dist. Of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212–13 (1963); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
330 Id. at 701.
331 Id. at 682.
332 Id.
333 Id. at 681.
334 Id. at 689.
335 Id. at 691–92.
336 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
337 Id.
338 Id. at 1129.
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 Id.
329
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Establishment Clause by displaying the Ten Commandments alone.343 This left
the city with a hard choice: take down the Ten Commandments or put up the
Seven Aphorisms.344
The Pleasant Grove City Court accepted neither approach, and held for the
government.345 The Court treated the Ten Commandments monument as a
form of permissible government speech.346 A government “‘is entitled to say
what it wishes,’” Justice Alito wrote for the Court, and it may select and reflect
certain views in favor of others.347 A government may express its views by
putting up its own tax-paid monuments or by accepting monuments donated by
private parties (whose contents it need not fully endorse).348 In this case, city
officials had earlier accepted a Ten Commandments monument on grounds
that it reflected the “[a]esthetics, history, and local culture” of the city.349 The
Free Speech Clause does not give a private citizen a “‘heckler’s veto’”350 over
that old decision by the city. Nor does it compel the city to accept every
privately donated monument once it has accepted the first.351 Government
speech is simply “not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause,” the
Court concluded, nor to judicial second-guessing under the First
Amendment.352 Government officials are “‘accountable to the electorate’” for
their speech, and they will be voted out of office if their views cause
offense.353
It helped the Pleasant Grove City Court that there were a dozen monuments
in the city park, only one of which was religious in content.354 It also helped
that the Decalogue in question was a forty-year-old monument that had never
been challenged before.355 Such facts allowed some of the Justices to agree that
the display did not constitute an establishment of religion.356 But the case

343

Id.
Id. at 1139.
345 Id. at 1125.
346 Id.
347 Id. at 1127 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
348 Id. at 1136.
349 Id. at 1128.
350 Id. at 1131 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting)).
351 Id. at 1138.
352 Id. at 1125.
353 Id. at 1127 (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)).
354 Id. at 1125.
355 Id. at 1140.
356 Id.
344
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turned on a characterization of the Ten Commandments monument as a form
of government speech—not as a secularized icon of ceremonial deism or as a
religious symbol sufficiently buffered by secular equivalents.357 The Pleasant
Grove City Court did not deny or dilute the religious qualities of the Ten
Commandments.358 Instead, it left it to elected government officials to decide
how to reflect and represent the views of the people, including their religious
views.359 The Court also left it to the people to debate and decide whether the
government’s representation of their views was adequate or outmoded.360
Courts could certainly step in if the government coerced citizens to accept the
religious views on these symbols, or if the government’s speech violated
privacy, endangered society, or violated the Constitution.361 However, a merely
passive display of a generic religious symbol or text was not nearly enough to
trigger federal judicial intervention.362
E. The Cross in the National Park
The Supreme Court did not use this government-speech logic in Salazar v.
Buono.363 The case, as discussed in the Introduction, concerned a challenge to
a seven-foot cross on prominent display in the Mojave National Preserve in
California.364 The cross had been donated and erected in 1934 by a private
group, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, as a memorial to fallen American
soldiers.365 The cross stood alone.366 A few years earlier, a Buddhist group had
sought to place one of its shrines near the cross, but the government had denied
their application.367 A former park worker now challenged its
Constitutionality.368
Observers had expected the Salazar Court to return to Pleasant Grove City,
and decide whether this privately-donated cross in a federal park, like the
privately donated Decalogue in a city park, would be viewed as a

357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368

Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1132.
Id.
Id. at 1125.
See id.
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
Id. at 1826.
Id. at 1807.
Id. at 1834.
Buono v. Norton (Buono II), 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1803.
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constitutionally permissible form of government speech.369 Unlike Pleasant
Grove City, there were no nearby secular buffers to offset the religious
message, but here the cross was a non-verbal symbol, its location was much
more remote, and it had stood almost twice as long without challenge.370 The
six fractured opinions in Salazar, however, focused largely on Buono’s
standing rights, the Constitutionality of Congress’s private land sale, and the
district court’s authority to enjoin it.371
Writing for himself and two other Justices, Justice Kennedy concluded that
Buono had standing both to press his original case that challenged the
Constitutionality of the cross display on federal land and to press his
subsequent case that challenged the federal land sale.372 But Kennedy was not
convinced that the district court had jurisdiction to extend its original
injunction against the cross to enjoin the congressional act authorizing the land
sale.373 The decision to enjoin the land sale required a separate Constitutional
inquiry whether Congress had truly violated the Establishment Clause, not just
a simple judgment that its act was a “sham” designed to “evade” the first
injunction.374 The district court would now have to judge Congress’s actions
on the merits.375 In making this judgment, Kennedy continued, the district
court would have to take into account the reality that while the cross was
“certainly a Christian symbol,” it had not been erected in the park “to promote
a Christian message” or to “set the imprimatur of the state on a particular
creed. Rather, those who erected the cross intended simply to honor our
Nation’s fallen soldiers.”376 The district court would further have to recognize
that “[t]ime also has played its role” and “the cross and the cause it
commemorated had become entwined in the public consciousness” and part of
“our national heritage.”377 Justice Kennedy thus reversed the order enjoining
the land transfer and remanded the case to the district court to judge the
Constitutionality of Congress’s act on the merits and in light of these factors.378

369

See generally Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70

(2009).
370
371
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374
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Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1803.
Id.
Id. at 1808.
Id. at 1815.
Id. at 1814, 1817.
Id. at 1815.
Id. at 1816–17.
Id. at 1817.
Id. at 1821.
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Joining the plurality opinion, Justice Alito thought the case was sufficiently
developed for the Supreme Court itself to make that Constitutional judgment—
and in favor of the government.379 The cross had been privately donated to
honor the nation’s war dead (just like crosses in government cemeteries
everywhere), it had stood without challenge for seventy years, and it was an
utterly remote corner of a desert park “seen by more rattlesnakes than
humans.”380 Also joining the plurality opinion, Justices Scalia and Thomas
thought that Buono lacked standing to seek an injunction of the land sale and
the district court lacked power to issue the injunction.381 Buono is asking a
federal court to prevent the display of a small cross on private land, they
concluded; this leaves no Constitutional question to resolve.382
That characterization missed the Constitutional point, Justice Stevens wrote
in dissent, joined by three other Justices.383 The issue is whether the original
display of the cross violates the Establishment Clause, and whether Congress’s
actions in response to the district court order can be seen as an evasion—much
like the government’s actions in the McCreary County case, which had been
judged unconstitutional.384 Justice Stevens concluded that both the purpose and
effect of the land transfer statute was to endorse religion in violation of the
establishment clause.385 In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer concluded that the
district court did have power to enjoin the land transfer, making unnecessary
any further inquiry into Establishment Clause issues.386
F. Rules of Thumb in Future Religious Symbolism Cases
This thirty-year line of religious symbolism cases—from Stone v. Graham
to Salazar v. Buono387—has easily been the least steady of the Court’s
Establishment Clause cases. Many of these cases turn heavily on the facts, and
how these facts are characterized. Many feature widely discordant opinions,
sometimes cast in rhetorically bombastic terms. The Court still seems a long
way from creating a new concordance of its discordant precedents—though
Linkner’s article hereafter makes a valiant effort to find coherence among the
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387

Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1822.
Id. at 1824 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1828 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 1841.
Id. at 1837.
Id. at 1843 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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jumbled opinions.388 So far, there are only a few rules of thumb to guide
litigants and lower courts in these matters. Four are worth mentioning here—
with the caveat that while each might be useful, none is dispositive.
First, older religious displays and practices tend to fare better than newer
displays, particularly if they have not faced much prior Constitutional
challenge. Even if the original inspiration for the old display or practice was
religious, its longstanding presence in public life seems to imbue it with a kind
of cultural and Constitutional imprimatur. In the Court’s view, it has become a
part of American culture, society, and democracy—and is thus unlikely to be a
fateful first step toward an establishment of religion.389 Sometimes the Court
has implied that even if the display or practice once had specific religious
meaning, that meaning has now been lost; and the display is now either merely
a civic symbol devoid of religious content or a more generic symbol that
evinces “ceremonial deism.”390 Other times, the Court has worked harder to
acknowledge the ongoing religious nature and content of the symbol for many
citizens.391
Moreover, if Establishment Clause litigants sit on their rights too long,
those rights tend to receive less deference when they are finally exercised.
Older religious displays and practices were at issue in Lynch, Van Orden,
Pleasant Grove City, and Buono, and the government won each time.392 Newer
displays were at issue in Stone, County of Allegheny, and McCreary County,
and the government lost each time.393
The law recognizes both the power and the pressure of time in other areas.
For example, the power of time can be seen in historical preservation and
zoning rules that “grandfather” various older (religious) uses of property that
do not comport with current preferred uses.394 It can also be seen in private
property laws of “adverse possession”: an open, continuous, and notorious use
388
389

See generally Linkner, supra note 23.
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677

(2005).
390 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (quoting Arthur E. Sutherland, Book Review, 40 IND.
L.J. 83, 86 (1964)).
391 See McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 544 U.S. 844 (2005); Stone, 449 U.S. at
39.
392 Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1125; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668; Buono
II, 371 F.3d 543, 543 (9th Cir. 2004).
393 McCreary County, 544 U.S. at 844; County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 573 (1989); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39 (1980).
394 MARIANNE M. JENNINGS, REAL ESTATE LAW 536 (2008).
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of a property eventually will vest in the user.395 Those legal ideas have some
bearing on these religious symbolism cases, leaving older displays more secure
but new displays more vulnerable. The law further recognizes the pressure of
time in its rules of pleading and procedure. In order to promote finality and to
prevent stale claims, legislatures set statutes of limitations on many claims.396
The law has also long done the same through the equitable doctrine of laches,
which similarly penalizes parties for sitting too long on their rights.397 While
the law does not set statutes of limitations on Constitutional cases, and the
Court has never explicitly invoked laches, the idea itself seems to influence the
Court. “If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common
consent”—especially at the local level, Justice Holmes once wrote—“it will
need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it.”398
Second, it can be critical to a case how the symbol or practice is labeled or
characterized. Stone and McCreary County characterized the Decalogue as a
religious symbol and struck it down;399 Van Orden and Pleasant Grove City
characterized it as an historical marker and let it stand.400 Lynch labeled the
crèche a mere holiday display with commercial value, and let it stand;401
County of Allegheny labeled the crèche a depiction of the Christmas story, and
struck it down.402 Pinette called the Latin cross a form of private expression
protected by the free speech clause;403 Pleasant Grove City called the
Decalogue a form of government speech immune from the Free Speech
Clause.404 Lynch labeled the secular decorations around the crèche an effective
buffer;405 McCreary County regarded the secular documents around the
Decalogue as fraudulent camouflage.406 For Stone, labeling the Decalogue as a
moral code was viewed as a subterfuge belied by the very imperative tone of
395

Id. at 344.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-24 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 260, § 2A (West 2011);
N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE LAW § 213 (McKinney 2011).
397 GREGORY C. SISK ET AL., LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 529 (4th ed. 2006).
398 Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
399 McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 858 (2005); Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39, 39 (1980).
400 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1126 (2009); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,
681 (2005).
401 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984).
402 County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79
(1989).
403 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995).
404 Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1126.
405 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.
406 McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 852 (2005).
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the Commandments.407 For County of Allegheny, labeling a forty-five-foot
county Christmas tree as “A Salute to Liberty” was sufficient Constitutional
cover for placement of a menorah.408 County of Allegheny treated as
constitutionally fatal two signs at the crèche bearing the imperative “Gloria in
Excelsis Deo” and “Donated by the Holy Name Society.”409 Van Orden
thought a small sign reading, “Presented . . . by the Fraternal Order of Eagles”
offset any Constitutional offense to a six-foot Decalogue with imperatives like,
“Thou shalt have no other gods before me,” “Thou shalt not take the Name of
the Lord thy God in vain,” and “Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it
holy.”410 Characterization of the symbol or practice can be key to its
Constitutional fate.
Third, geographical location can also be important. Government-sponsored
displays on private property, as in Lynch,411 get more deference than private
displays on government property, as in Stone and County of Allegheny.412
Displays in prominent places on government properties, like the grand
staircase in County of Allegheny413 or the main hallway in the McCreary
County courthouse,414 are more suspect than those in less conspicuous places,
like the secondary entrance in County of Allegheny,415 the secondary sidewalk
in Van Orden,416 the small city park in Pleasant Grove City,417 or the remote
desert corner of a national park in Buono.418 Location is not dispositive of the
Establishment Clause question, as litigants in Pinette found out; in that case,
religious activities and displays on the plaza of the state capitol were upheld.419
But location is a factor in some cases. And location can play a key role if it
strongly influences whether citizens are actually or effectively forced to
observe or participate in the religious exercise. That smacks of coercion and

407
408

Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39 (1980).
County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 635
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Id. at 573.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 707 (2005).
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573; Stone, 449 U.S. at 39.
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 675.
McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 852 (2005).
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 677 (2005).
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009).
Buono II, 371 F.3d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 2004).
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995).
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leads the Court to find a violation of the establishment clause, as in Stone420
and various cases on prayer in public schools.421
A fourth factor is whether the religious symbol or practice is offset by other
secular symbols or practices. Particularly when the government sponsors or
houses religious symbols on its property, it is best to offset these religious
symbols by non-religious symbols of comparable size, weight, and genre.
McCreary County makes clear that a court can (and sometimes will) second
guess the government when the court suspects subterfuge.422 But lower courts
have generally been sympathetic with government officials who try to balance
religious and non-religious messages in their public display.423 In assessing the
balance, they will make rough judgments whether the offsetting symbols’
messages are of comparable genre; whether its religious qualities are obvious
or more abstract; and whether the religious symbol is suitable or unsuitable for
the government forum.424 For example, a Renaissance “Madonna With Child”
may be fine in the foyer of the state museum but not in the entrance to the state
capitol. This, like all these rules of thumb, merely reiterates that context
matters.
CONCLUSION AND POSTSCRIPT425
The Salazar case and the Lautsi case were not inevitable in result given the
shifting precedents available to the high courts of the United States and
Europe, respectively. And neither case is likely to end the perennially
contested questions of the Constitutional place of religious symbols on
government land.
At the time of this writing, Salazar is back before the federal district court
that now must judge the Constitutionality of Congress’s decision to sell the
land.426 Since the Salazar case was remanded, the Ninth Circuit Court of
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Appeals has just issued another opinion, striking down another old memorial
cross that the city of San Diego sold to Congress in an effort to preserve it
against an Establishment Clause challenge.427 However the Salazar district
court comes out on remand, the case will almost certainly be appealed again to
the same Ninth Circuit court and likely to the Supreme Court as well.
Just as this Article was going to final press, the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights issued an important opinion that upheld
Italy’s policy of displaying crucifixes in its public school classrooms, reversing
the Chamber below in a fifteen to two decision.428 The Grand Chamber stated
clearly that the crucifix is a religious symbol, that atheism is a protected
religious belief, and that public schools must be religiously neutral.429 But the
Court held that Italy’s longstanding policy of “passive displays” of a crucifix
in each public school classroom was no violation of religious freedom—
particularly when students of all faiths were welcome in public schools and
were free to wear their own religious symbols.430 The Court held further that
Italy’s policy of displaying only the crucifix was no violation of religious
neutrality, but an acceptable democratic reflection of its majoritarian Catholic
culture.431 With European nations widely divided on whether and where to
display various religious symbols, the Court concluded, Italy must be granted a
margin of appreciation to decide for itself how and where to maintain its
Christian traditions in school.432
There is much more to be said about the Grand Chamber’s judgment in
Lautsi. But what is notable here is how closely the Grand Chamber’s logic
tracks that of the U.S. Supreme Court in its last three religious symbolism
cases—Van Orden, Pleasant Grove City, and Salazar.433 While not entirely
convergent in their religious symbolism cases, the American and European
high courts now seem to hold six teachings in common.
First, tradition counts in these cases. In American courts, as we saw, older
religious displays tend to fare better than newer displays.434 The longstanding
customary presence of a religious symbol in public life eventually renders it
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not only acceptable but also indispensable to defining who we are as a people.
In Lautsi, Judge Bonello put this argument strongly in his concurrence: “A
court of human rights cannot allow itself to suffer from historical Alzheimer’s.
It has no right to disregard the cultural continuum of a nation’s flow through
time, nor to ignore what, over the centuries, has served to mould and define the
profile of a people.”435
Second, religious symbols often have redeeming cultural value. American
courts have long recognized that a Decalogue is not only a religious
commandment but also a common moral code; that a cross is not only a
Christian symbol, but also a poignant memorial to military sacrifice.436 When
passively and properly displayed, the meaning of a symbol can be left in the
eye of the beholder—a sort of free market hermeneutic. The Lautsi court
echoed this logic. While recognizing the crucifix as religious in origin, the
Court accepted Italy’s argument that “the crucifix [also] symbolised the
principles and values” of liberty, equality, and fraternity, which “formed the
foundation of democracy” and human rights in Italy and beyond.437
Third, local values deserve some deference. In the United States, the
doctrine of federalism requires federal courts to defer to the practices and
policies of individual states, unless there are clear violations of federal
constitutional rights to free exercise and no establishment of religion.438 The
Supreme Court has used this doctrine to uphold the passive display of crosses
and Decalogues on state capitol grounds.439 The Lautsi Court uses the
European margin of appreciation doctrine in much the same way. Lacking
European consensus on public displays of religion and finding no coerced
religious practice or indoctrination in this case, the Court left Italy to decide for
itself how to balance the religious symbolism of its Catholic majority and the
religious freedom and education rights of its atheistic minorities.440
Fourth, religious freedom does not require the secularization of society.
The U.S. Supreme Court became famous for its image of a “high and
impregnable” wall of separation between church and state441 that left religion
hermetically sealed from political life and public institutions, and
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hermeneutically sealed from political and legal arguments. But the reality
today is that the Supreme Court has abandoned much of its strict separatism
and now allows religious and non-religious parties alike to engage in peaceable
public activities, even in public schools.442 The European Court of Human
Rights likewise became famous for promoting French-style laïcité in public
schools and public life, striking down Muslim headscarves and other religious
symbols as contrary to the democratic “message of tolerance, respect for others
and . . . equality and non-discrimination.”443 Lautsi suggests a new policy that
respects the rights of private religious and secular groups alike to express their
views, but allows government to reflect democratically the traditional religious
views of its majority.444
Fifth, religious freedom does not give a minority a heckler’s veto over
majoritarian policies. Until recently, U.S. courts allowed taxpayers to
challenge any law touching religion even if it caused them no real personal
injury.445 This effectively gave secularists a “veto” over sundry laws and
policies on religion—however old, common, or popular those laws might be.446
The Supreme Court has now tightened its standing rules considerably, forcing
parties to make many of their cases for legal reform in the legislatures and to
seek individual exemptions from policies that violate their beliefs.447 Lautsi
holds similarly. It recognizes that while the crucifix may cause offense to
Lautsi, it represents the cherished cultural values of millions of others, who, in
turn, are offended by her views.448 But personal offense cannot be a ground for
censorship.449 Freedom of religion and expression requires that all views be
heard in public life.450
Finally, religious symbolism cases are serious business. As we said in the
Introduction, it is easy to be cynical about these cases. But the high
temperature of the litigation and the close focus of the international media on
these cases suggest that religious symbolism cases are themselves symbolically
important for a democratic culture. These cases are essential forums to work
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out peaceably deep cultural differences and to find ways of accommodating
both traditions and the shifting needs of modern cultures.

